NEW YORK OR THE CHESAPEAKE

NEW YORK OR THE CHESAPEAKE ?

FRANCO-AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE SUMMER OF 1781

9.2 The Washington-Rochambeau Correspondence with Admiral de Grasse

9.3 14 August 1781: The Day that shook the World

Reviewing the results of the Grand Reconnaissance, Lauberdière noted in his Journal that given the size of the garrison, estimated at 16,000 by the young comte, the strength of the fortifications, the necessity of naval superiority, and the weakness of the combined Franco-American army, "should all have made the Americans and their commanding officer turn away from the idea of a siege." But the decision was not Lauberdière's to make. He would have to wait with Washington and Rochambeau for news from Admiral de Grasse. Both men were aware that without additional troops, American or French, and at least temporary naval superiority, any attack on New York was doomed to fail. The combined strength of their armies outside New York was less than 10,000 men and there was little hope of additional American troops joining that late in the campaign. Arrayed against them were a wide variety of British, German, and American regular and irregular units in and around the city. As the summer was slipping away without a word from de Grasse, Washington was getting nervous. On 26 July, 41-year-old Colonel Jonathan Trumbull Jr., Washington's private secretary, wrote to his father, the governor of Connecticut: "The Genl is exceedingly anxious & finds himself in a most perplexing & ridiculous scituation, not being able to determine on any fixed plan of operation, from the incertainty of his expectations & prospects. I wish the states would reflect that the first of August is already nearly come, & not one encouragement made by them yet fulfilled." [1] But "[B]etween the 12^th and 18^th" of August, so Trumbull, the "Plan of Operation was totally changed." [2] Why? What was the old, and what was the new, plan of operations?

After months of disappointment, everything started to fall into place for the Franco-American alliance in the summer of 1781, so much so that even some contemporaries suspected a grandiose plan to have brought about the decisive victory at Yorktown later that year. Frequently, and for obvious reasons, it has been assumed that the campaign was planned at Wethersfield in May 1781. Cast in bronze the claim is even made on a plaque at the entrance to the Wadsworth Atheneum in Hartford. In this interpretation the six-week sojourn of the Franco-American army before New York in July and August of 1781, was but part of an intricate scheme to deceive Sir Henry Clinton into thinking that he was the target of attack but that it was really Cornwallis that Washington and Rochambeau were after all along. The two generals never intended to attack New York, so the story goes, but were marking time until the arrival of de Grasse from the West Indies. The massing of French and American troops before New York was but Phase One in a two-phase plan agreed upon at Wethersfield that would take the allies to Yorktown. The plan was so secret that only Rochambeau, Washington, and de Grasse knew about it.

"Thus," so American historian Lee Kennett, "it would seem, was a legend born." [3] And like so many legends, this one too refuses to die, even though, attractive as may been to contemporaries already, the theory does not hold up in the light of events. At Wethersfield, Washington had urged an attack on New York, and Rochambeau, though never in favor of such a plan, agreed to march his troops to White Plains. The decision to abandon the siege of New York and to march south was forced upon Washington on August 14, 1781, when de Grasse's letter of March 28 reached Rochambeau, informing him that he was sailing for the Chesapeake. When Rochambeau told the American general that he would march to Virginia, Washington had no choice but to go along.

What then were the parameters within which Washington and Rochambeau had to work in May of 1781? They had but two options: 1) a siege of New York that would hopefully culminate in a successful attack on the center of British power in America, and 2) a march to the south to destroy Cornwallis' regiments, thereby liberating the southern colonies from a British occupation that had begun with the conquest of Savannah by British troops under Sir Henry Clinton in December 1778. Sir Henry Clinton in New York was as aware of these options as was everyone else. The wildcards in either plan were Lord Cornwallis, who was marching almost at will across the southern states, and de Grasse, upon whose cooperation the success of either operation depended. But de Grasse stood neither under Washington’s nor under Rochambeau’s command, and the time of his arrival was as uncertain as a guess as to where Cornwallis might be at any given moment. The question was: which one of these two options would be pursued?

Ever since the arrival of his son in Boston on May 6, 1781, Rochambeau had known what his resources for the summer campaign would be. He was free to draw up his own plans, possibly in cooperation with de Grasse, who he knew was on his way to the Caribbean and might be able to provide naval support in North American waters. But here already is the first problem with the secret plan. Ségur had ordered Rochambeau NOT to inform Washington of the arrival of a naval force off the North American coast in July or August. [4] De Grasse's cooperation was crucial for the success of any plan, but unless Rochambeau lied in his letter to Ségur of June 1, he did not tell Washington, who could not let on that he knew about de Grasse after all, though not from Rochambeau! [5]

Once he had heard about the arrival of Admiral Jacques Melchior, comte de Barras, the replacement for the deceased Admiral de Ternay, and the vicomte, Washington was anxious to meet with Rochambeau. Rather than in Hartford, bustling with legislators assembled for their annual meeting, Washington suggested the village of Wethersfield a few miles south of the Connecticut capital. The day was to be May 21, [6] but just as Rochambeau was about to leave, British vessels appeared off of Newport and forced Barras to remain behind. Since he wanted to have a general officer who spoke English with him, Rochambeau asked the chevalier de Chastellux to accompany him.

Few French or American eyewitness accounts of the Wethersfield Conference have survived. None of Rochambeau's seven aides who left diaries, journals, or letters -- his son, [7] Baron Closen, [8] Axel von Fersen, [9] Mathieu Dumas, [10] Cromot du Bourg, [11] the marquis du Bouchet, [12] and the comte de Lauberdière [13] -- mention Wethersfield on their itineraries. Though it is unthinkable that the two generals rode to Wethersfield alone, we do not know who their aides were at the conference. [14] On the American side, the papers of Washington's private secretary Alexander Hamilton contain no information on the conference; [15] neither do the papers of Henry Knox, [16] while the papers of Brigadier Louis le Bègue Duportail do not seem to have survived. [17] We are primarily dependent upon the diary of Washington as far as the conference is concerned. It states: "22^d(Tuesday). Fixed with Count de Rochambeau upon plan of Campaign." [18]

In celebration of the event, Washington, Rochambeau, Trumbull and Wadsworth had dinner that night at Stillman's Tavern (no longer standing), and the next day, "23^d Count de Rochambeau set out on his return to Newport, while I prepared and forwarded dispatches to the Governors of the four New England States calling upon them in earnest and pointed terms, to compleat their Continental Battalions for the Campaign." [19]

But what was the plan of campaign? Similar to the proceedings at Hartford the previous September, Rochambeau wrote his questions in column form on the left-hand side of a sheet of paper. Once they had been discussed, Washington wrote his answers in a column on the right-hand side of the page to be translated by Chastellux. [20] In response to Rochambeau's queries, Washington, for political and military reasons, was pushing, as he had for the past year, for an attack on New York which, he argued, would have the added advantage of forcing Clinton to transfer troops from Cornwallis's army, thereby "creating a diversion," in the parlance of the times, for Lafayette. [21] But Washington, who had been told that Ségur's instructions placed the French troops under his command, left no doubt that his primary objective was New York. "It is General Washington's opinion that the plan of the campaign is for the French army to march from Newport toward the North River as soon as possible, and that consequently it will be advisable for the Count de Barras (agreeable to his instructions in that case provided) to seek the first favorable moment of removing the squadron under his command to Boston." [22]

Now that Washington had had his say, Rochambeau floated a different idea. "Should the squadron from the West Indies arrive in these seas, an event that will probably be announced by a frigate beforehand, what operations will General Washington have in view after a union of the French army with his own?"

If Rochambeau was trying to sound out Washington, the American did not play his game: Washington had known for weeks that de Grasse would be coming north. His source: the chevalier de Chastellux. From Newport on May 12 -- the vicomte had landed in Boston on May 6, Rochambeau had read the dispatches and written to Washington on the 8^th, Washington received Rochambeau's letter concerning his instructions from Paris on the 13^th -- and again from White's Tavern in Andover, Connecticut, on May 21, the night before the Wethersfield Conference, Chastellux had informed Washington of Ségur's secret instructions and of the possibility of de Grasse coming north. [23] Knowing that Rochambeau was not sharing all his information (but keeping the secret to himself), Washington's reply confirmed what he had said earlier. In a table dated "Weatherfield, May 22, 1781" and compiled for the conference, he set the strength of the Continental Army at 10,700 men. After deductions for the various theatres of war, he estimated the strength of his troops at 8,250; he even thought it "probable" that 2,000 more would join "if New York shd. be the declared, or apparent object" of the attack. If Rochambeau was not totally honest with his American counterpart, Washington in turn knew that his numbers rested on creative book-keeping: 8,000 men was more than twice the number of men in winter quarters in May 1781! But if one added Rochambeau's 5,000 men and the 3,000 to 5,000 men that Washington hoped de Grasse would bring, to the 8,000 he claimed he would have available, and if one accepted the number of 7,500 regular and irregular troops in New York as presented at Wethersfield as realistic, the minimum 2:1 ratio of attacking vs defending forces required for any successful attack, was reached. [24]

Washington, of course, accepted the premises of his proposal. He held it "advisable to form a junction of the French and American armies upon the North River as soon as possible, and move down to the vicinity of New York, to be ready to take advantage of any opportunity which the weakness of the enemy might afford. Should the West India fleet arrive upon the coast, the force thus combined may either proceed in the operations against New York or may be directed against the enemy in some other quarter, as circumstances shall dictate. The great waste of men, which we have found from experience in the long marches to the southern States, the advanced season in which such a march must be commenced, and the difficulties and expense of land transportation thither, with other considerations too well known to Count de Rochambeau to need detailing, point out the preference which an operation against New York seems to have in the present circumstances over an attempt to send a force to the southward."

In his diary, he summarized Wethersfield in these words: "That the French Land force (except 200 Men) should March as soon as the Squadron could Sail for Boston -- to the North River -- and there, in conjunction with the American, to commence an operation against New York (which in the present reduced State of the Garrison it was thought would fall, unless relieved; the doing which wd. enfeeble their Southern operations, and in either case be productive of capital advantages) or to extend our views to the South-ward as circumstances and a Naval superiority might render more necessary and eligible." Then follows a list of reasons such as "the insurmountable difficulty and expence of Land transportation -- the waste of Men in long Marches (especially where there is a disinclination to the service -- objections to the climate &ca)" that made an attack on New York preferable to any other objective for the campaign of 1781. [25]

Rochambeau's Mémoire de la Guerre en Amérique, written in November 1781 for transmittal to Versailles, too states that Washington considered New York his prime objective: "General Washington throughout this conference urged an offensive with the capture of New York as the principal objective. He thought that this one blow would cripple the English position in America. He could recall the various detachments that had been sent South, and he believed, along with the American harbor pilots, that the bar of the port was not impossible even for the largest ships. [26] He considered an expedition to Chesapeake Bay as a secondary objective on which he did not want to waste resources when he was not sure that he had enough resources for his primary objective." [27]

In his Memoirs he wrote: "General Washington, during this conference, had scarcely another object in view but an expedition against the island of New York, and which he persisted in considering the most capable of striking a death-blow to British domination in America. He was aware of the enemy's forces having been thinned at this place by the detachments which had been drafted from its garrison, and sent to the south, … He considered an expedition against Lord Cornwallis, in Chesapeak Bay, as quite a secondary object, to which there was no necessity of diverting our attention until we were quite certain of our inability to accomplish the former." [28]

Dumas in his memoirs wrote: "Count de Rochambeau and Washington met on the 20^th of May at Westerfield (sic), near Hartford, in Connecticut, to confer … on the operations which it was most advisable to undertake, whether in the north, against New York, or in Virginia, against the army of Lord Cornwallis. General Washington thought that New York should be immediately attacked, by which a more decisive blow would be given to the English power. … M. de Rochambeau, on the contrary, judged that it was better to operate in Chesapeak Bay, where the French fleet might act more promptly, and with greater facility." [29] Rochambeau's nephew and aide-de-camp the comte de Lauberdière was even more emphatic in his Journal: "Le général n'avait d'autre object en vue, n'avait d'autre desir que le siège de New York -- the general (i.e., Washington) had no other object in view, no other desire but the siege of New York." [30] That was not what Rochambeau wanted, but in the spirit of Franco-American cooperation he promised his full cooperation once the decision to prepare for an attack on New York had been made.

New York was the prime object of the plan for the summer, had to be in May 1781. At the time of the conference, Washington did not even know where Cornwallis was! He had had no intelligence from the South since May 5, when he received a letter from Lafayette informing him that Cornwallis had marched from Wilmington on April 25 with about 1,500 men. On May 20, the day before the two generals sat down to discuss their options, Cornwallis had integrated the British forces in Virginia into his own near Petersburg, a fact not known in New Windsor until June 4. Based on a letter by Lafayette of June 3, Washington informed Rochambeau on June 13, that the British forces were somewhere between Richmond and Fredericksburg and “at full liberty to go wherever they pleased.” No one could predict where Cornwallis would be in August or in September, and as long as Cornwallis remained far inland, de Grasse would not be able to help, no matter when, and with how many ships, he would appear in the Chesapeake!

Next Washington informed his friends in and out of Congress that New York had been selected as the target. Convinced that there were no more than 8,500 regulars and about 3,000 militias in the city, he informed the chevalier de la Luzerne, French minister to the United States, on May 23, 1781, "of the intended march of the French army towards the North River. … I should be wanting in respect and confidence were I not to add, that our object is New York. The Season, the difficulty and experience of Land transportation, and the continual waste of men in every attempt to reinforce the Southern states, are almost insuperable objections to marching another from the Army on the North River." [31]

On the 27^th he informed Congress that "Upon full consideration of Affairs in every point of view, an operation against New York has been deemed preferable to making further detachments to the southward." [32] On the 28^th he asked Henry Knox, his chief of artillery, and Duportail, his chief engineer, and Quarter-Master General Timothy Pickering "to give estimates of their wants for the intended operation against New York." [33] Since both Knox and DuPortail had been at the Wethersfield Conference and, as he wrote in his May 28 notes to the two officers, "are perfectly acquainted with the measures which have been concerted with the Count de Rochambeau," such requests would have been nonsensical unless, of course, the three men were also in the dark! [34]

On May 29, Washington wrote General John Sullivan a letter that contained a full discussion of the decisions taken at Wethersfield and thought the attack on New York "promised the fairest prospect of success." [35] Similarly he informed Lafayette, commanding officer in Virginia, on May 31, that "an attempt upon New York with its present Garrison (which by estimation is reduced to 4500 Troops and about 3000 irregulars) was deemed preferable to a Southern operation." [36] And finally, he wrote to Nathaniel Greene in North Carolina on June 1, that at Wethersfield "it was determined to make an attempt upon New York." [37] Surely he would have let his lieutenants in the south know if a move in their direction was in the offing!

If the theory that Washington had planned a march to Virginia at Wethersfield while pretending to lay siege to New York were true, Washington's actions between May 23 and May 31 would mean that he had in rapid succession lied, 1) to Congress, 2) to La Luzerne, 3) to Lafayette, 4) to Sullivan, 5) to Knox, 6) to Duportail, 7) to Pickering, and 8) to Greene, not to mention to himself in his diary! This hardly fits the image of a man who could not tell a lie. And that Rochambeau, in collaboration with Washington, played the game of deception as well with his staff, even though there was no need for it. Because Versailles would not have been Versailles if secrets could have been kept: on May 26, 1781, Washington recorded in his diary: "Received a letter from the Honble Jno. Laurens Minister from the United States of America at the Court of Versailles -- informing me … that a Fleet of 20 Sail of the Line was on its departure for the West Indies 12 of which were to proceed to this Coast where it was probable they might arrive in the Month of July." [38] The secret Rochambeau was trying to keep was confirmed.

More importantly, on 3 June 1781, thirteen letters, including all four of Washington letters -- to La Luzerne on May 23, to Congress on May 27, to Sullivan on May 29, and to Lafayette on May 31 -- were intercepted by Ensign John Moody, convincing Clinton that he was the target of the 1781 campaign. [39] General James Robertson confirmed that Rochambeau had not been completely open with Washington: "Washington seems at the time of writing 31^st of May to know nothing of any french reinforcemens being on the sea to join him." [40] But Clinton had more evidence. On May 27, Rochambeau had informed La Luzerne via Washington of the decisions arrived at in the Wethersfield Conference. In this letter of May 27, from Newport, Rochambeau told la Luzerne that he had informed Washington of his instructions though he "suppressed the article concerning M. de Grasse because I was ordered to keep it to myself but I was obliged in the meantime to talk about the issue speculatively. … I also suppressed all articles concerning what to do in the case that his (i.e., Washington's) army disintegrated which I also could not lay before his eyes." Nevertheless, the time had come to "entreprendre sur New York," to try, or make an attempt, upon New York. As far as the conference at Wethersfield was concerned, Rochambeau simply included a copy of the proceedings, with his questions in the right-hand column and Washington's responses on the left. [41]

This note also fell into British hands on 3 June but had to be deciphered in London. By August 2, it was back, confirming Clinton's conviction that he would be attacked. There is still more. On 1 June, shortly after his return from Wethersfield, Chastellux, again behind Rochambeau's back, had written to La Luzerne indicating, so Closen, "that finally, despite M. de Rochambeau's ill humor with the help of M. du Portail, he had succeeded in persuading General Rochambeau to besiege New York." [42] This letter was to be forwarded to Philadelphia via Washington's headquarters but intercepted as well on June 3 by Clinton's patrols. Clinton sent Rochambeau the original with a note "that he ought to be on guard against his associates." [43] Rochambeau's Mémoirs, which are often held up as proof for the secret plan theory, contain these sentences about the affair:

“But what completely deceived the English general, was a confidential letter written by the Chevalier de Chatellus to the French representative at Congress, where in he boasted of having artfully succeeded in bringing round my opinion to concur with that of General Washington; stating, at the same time, that the siege of the island of New York had been at length determined upon, and that our two armies were on the march for that city, and that orders had been sent on to M. de Grasse to come with his fleet and force his way over the bar of Sandyhook to the mouth of the harbour of New York.

The English officer who had charge of every branch of the spying department sent me a copy of the intercepted missive and, by so doing, his intention had not been most assuredly to set my wits at ease. I sent for the Chevalier de Chatellus; showed him the letter, and then threw it in the fire, and left him a prey to his own remorse. Of course, I did not endeavour to undeceive him, and, in the sequel, we shall see to what extent this general officer had been made the confidant of the real project which I proposed to the Count de Grasse when I returned to Newport.” [44]

Three points are important to note: 1) Chastellux, who had served as Rochambeau's translator at the conference and knew as well as anyone what had transpired, correctly reported the decision arrived at in Wethersfield: the preferred object of the campaign was the siege of New York. Clinton was "deceived," but only from hindsight because Chastellux himself did not know what Rochambeau had already suggested to de Grasse on May 28. And neither did Washington: Rochambeau's correspondence with de Grasse contradicts every piece of evidence emanating from Washington. 2) There is not one word about de Grasse sailing for New York, or anywhere else for that matter, in that letter though Chastellux knew about de Grasse, as his letters to Washington show. [45] If Rochambeau had told Chastellux of his secret instructions, which he would have been allowed to do, concerning de Grasse, he would also have told him that this was to be kept secret. Chastellux could count in Washington to not inform Rochambeau, but he did not know if La Luzerne knew. As it was, La Luzerne, who did know about de Grasse's instruction to sail north, but also withheld the information from Washington, was upset for more than one reason with what Chastellux had done. La Luzerne was a strong advocate of a southern strategy and on 20 May urged Barras and Rochambeau to adopt a southern strategy at the upcoming conference at Wethersfield rather than plan for an attack on New York. [46] 3) Rochambeau wrote that he proposed "the real project" to de Grasse only after his return to Newport! His "real project was different from the one discussed at Wethersfield with Washington, du Portail, Knox, and Chastellux. On May 28, the very same day that Washington asked Knox, Du Portail, and Pickering "to give estimates of their wants for the intended operation against New York," Rochambeau wrote de Grasse a letter which suggested a very different strategy for the summer of 1781. This is the letter which, so Rochambeau's aide-de-camp the Baron von Closen, the general "had written to the minister (la Luzerne) by the same courier, where he told him the true plan of the Chesapeake campaign (sic) which had been sent to M. de Grasse by the Concorde, [which] could not be decoded." [47] This passage too has been cited as evidence for a secret plan, but Closen is of course mistaken: Rochambeau's letter of May 27, to la Luzerne was, as we have seen, intercepted, decoded, and reported back to Clinton by August 2, 1781, leaving him plenty of time to adjust his plans if he had chosen to do so. Which he did not, and did not have to, because Rochambeau's letter talked about "entreprendre sur New York," to try, or make an attempt, upon New York.

9.2 The Washington-Rochambeau Correspondence with Admiral de Grasse

Born into an old noble family in southern France in 1722, de Grasse, the final member of the victorious triumvirate of 1781, had he entered the Naval Academy in Toulon at age 11 and spent his whole life on the oceans of the world. Returning to American waters in 1779, he commanded a squadron under comte d'Estaing at Grenada in July and was commanding officer of the French fleet in the Caribbean after d'Estaing had left for Europe following the aborted siege of Savannah. His health failing, the 58-year-old admiral sailed for France in late 1780 as well. His stay would be short. On March 22, 1781, Louis XV promoted de Grasse to Rear Admiral, and sent him back to the West Indies with 20 ships of the line, three frigates and 156 transport. Four days later, on 26 March, the comte de Barras sailed from France on the Concorde to replace Ternay had died on 15 December 1780.

On April 28, de Grasse's convoy, re-enforced by six ships of the line from Martinique, had arrived off the harbor of Port Royal on the island of Martinique. British Rear Admiral Samuel Hood was waiting for him, but in a stroke of that good fortune that would shine on the Franco-American alliance all year, Hood had but 18 ships against de Grasse's 26. Hoods superior, Admiral George Rodney had captured the Dutch island of St. Eustatius in February. A booty estimated at over £ 3.000.000, some 75 million livres, almost six times the 12.7 million livres France spent on Rochambeau's expedition! fell into British hands. Wanting to protect his loot, Rodney had withdrawn four of Hood's ships, giving de Grasse the superiority he needed to get his convoy safely into Port Royal on May 6. Following his conquest of Tobago on 2 June, de Grasse sailed for St. Domingo, where four more ships of the line joined his fleet on July 16. Now began the "most perfectly executed naval campaign of the age of sail." [48] As de Grasse was sailing for St. Domingo, Rochambeau and Barras learned via a Martinique newspaper enclosed in a letter from Washington from New Windsor dated 7 June 1781 of the admiral's safe arrival off Port Royal. In the same letter, Washington pointed out a newspaper paragraph with the news "très extraordinaire:" five men of war and 42 transports had separated from de Grasse's convoy and were headed for Rhode Island. [49]

A closer look at these dates and the events of the next three days points out additional impossibilities in the secret plan theory. It was on June 7, two weeks after Wethersfield, that Rochambeau and Washington learned of de Grasse's arrival in the Caribbean via a newspaper account. Washington still did not know, at least not officially, for another three days, that de Grasse had instructions to co-operate with Rochambeau. There still had been no correspondence whatsoever between Port Royal and Newport and/or New Windsor. De Grasse was completely in the dark about Franco-American plans, and would be until July 16, when he finally received Rochambeau's letter of May 28! By that time the Franco-American army had been outside New York for 10 days already.

But did Rochambeau's letter of May 28 to de Grasse, contain "the real plan" for 1781, namely a march to the south rather than a joint enterprise against New York, and if so, did Washington know, and approve of, its contents?

On May 28, two days after his return to Newport, Rochambeau summed up for de Grasse the decisions arrived at in Wethersfield: "Il a requis ensuite la marche du corps français à la rivière du Nord, pour, conjointement avec son armée, menacer et peut-être attaquer New York, pour procurer une diversion aux États du Sud … Then he asked for the march of the French forces to the North River to threaten, and maybe attack New York in cooperation with his army in order to create a diversion for the southern states" -- just what Washington had written in his diary.